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level of empirical consciousness. The real, accordingly, is that which
evidences itself through the sheer force of self-affirmation. The un-
real lacks this self-assertive coefficient. We come, therefore, to deny
reality to every concept which appears under contradictory aspects.
The fundamental law of thought is the law of identity; it, moreover,
is perfectly and satisfactorily comprehensive. From this fundamental
postulate the author deduces the unreality of the phenomenal world,
and, inasmuch as science has to do exclusively with the phenomenal,
it must, therefore, be a scien.ce of the unreal. In other words, the
phenomenal world necessarily resists all attempts at unification.
There can never be a metaphysic of science. The phenomenal must
be received merely at its face value. A further interpretation, a deeper
significance, a final generalization are alike impossible.
The real, therefore, is that which lives, moves and has its being in
the realm of pure thought. The essence of reality is personality and
the essence of personality is freedom. Hence, it is possible to deduce
the being of God, and God thus conceived becomes the norm of real-
ity, and the supreme object of religion, which is the necessary com-
plement of reality. Such, in the main, is the rough outline of the sys-
tem. The author's point of view, it seems to me, presents the evident
limitations of a too refined abstraction; his thought, therefore, lacks
that wealth of content which only the concrete can give. There are
two ways of rising to the higher level of pure thought, one by leaving
the lower level absolutely and thereby denying its reality altogether,
the other by so sublimating the lower that it preserves and manifests
its reality in the higher. The author, it seems to me, labors under the
disadvantage of pursuing the former of these two methods rather than
the latter.
JOHN GRIER HIBBKN.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.
The Utilitarian Estimate of Knowledge. PROFESSOR JAMES SETH.
The Philosophical Review, July, 1901, pp. 342-358.
This article is of special interest at the present time in the light of
the recent publication of Mr. Leslie Stephen's 'Utilitarianism.' The
difference in point of view is of course a radical one. Professor Seth's
insistence upon the value of knowledge for its own sake, irrespective of
its utility, is a most timely service. His conclusions may well be taken
as an antidote to the doctrines of Mr. Stephen, as expressed in his
' Utilitarianism'; at least, they fulfil the function of emphasizing the
fact that there may be another side to the question, and that it has a
case which merits at least a considerate hearing.
Professor Seth's position is briefly as follows:
IOO BPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS.
There is such a thing as knowledge which has no instrumental
value, and yet carries with it a worth of its own. It is to be assessed
not by any external standard, but by one which lies within. Much of
knowledge is for the wil l , but not all knowledge. If it is regarded as
having merely a practical value, it tends to lose even that value. There
is here a paradox which is similar to that of hedonism. Moreover, the
reflex influence of the disinterested pursuit of truth upon the scholar
himself has an ethical value which can not be too highly estimated.
T h e discussion is, however, generally epistemological rather than ethical.
T h e article abounds in historical allusions to the various systems
of philosophical thought which have failed wholly or in part to allow
a non-utilitarian factor in knowledge, notably the undue estimate on
the part of Kant of the importance of the practical reason.
This plea for pure science is one which merits very grave consid-
eration, whatever may be one's particular views concerning the gen-
eral doctrine of utilitarianism. The tendency of the present day
thought is to emphasize unduly the art of knowledge and to overlook
completely, in certain quarters at least, the science of knowledge.
This fact has a marked pedagogical significance. T h e average stu-
dent to-day in our universities, if not the whole student body, de-
termines his choice of studies in a large measure by their supposed
utility in reference to the work or profession of life; and interest in
intellectual pursuits rises and falls with barometric exactness accord-
ing as there may or may not be evidence of the possibility of
some practical application. This is but one of the many indications
at the present time, that these exclusively utilitarian ideas are in the
air, and have become all-pervasive. It seems to me that the essential
characteristic of a scholar is his devotion to some form of pure knowl-
edge for its own sake and that as there is a categorical imperative in
ethics, so likewise there is a categorical imperative in scholarship.
And in so far as the scholar comes to pursue knowledge with an eye
askance as to the benefits which may accrue either to himself or the
world at large, he is so far forth less worthy of the name of scholar.
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Those who have any regard for the ' old' psychology are sufficiently
warned in the preface that this book is not for them. It is a mono-
graph in scientific psychology; and this is neither more nor less than
